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The aim of this study is to examine whether different accrual  models 
detect earnings management in a sample of Spanish firms that have 
received GAAP  audit qualifications. 
The unexpected accruals obtained from the Jones model, the modified 
Jones model, the Jones working capital model and the modified Jones 
working capital model are significantly positive, supporting the 
hypothesis that earnings have been managed upwards. However, the 
unexpected accruals obtained from the margin model are not significantly 
positive. We should be cautious in the interpretation of these results 
because of the almost certainly bias towards the inclusions of the most 
obvious and spectacular cases of earnings management. Potential extreme 
financial performance bias can not be ruled out as explanation for these 
results. An important limitation of this paper is the reduced number of 
firms that constitutes the estimation sample and also the prediction 
sample.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The measurement of accruals plays an important role in accounting literature. 
This wide body of literature includes studies on the prediction of future cash 
flows, the market´ s pricing and value relevance of accruals versus cash flows 
(Bath et al. ,1999; Pfeiffer et al., 1998; Dechow, 1994), tests of earnings 
management where there is a firm-specific event or a multiperiod strategic 
approach (Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986, 1988), McNichols et al., 1988; Jones, 
1991; DeFond et al., 1994; DeFond et al., 1998; McCulloch, 1998; Erikson et 
al., 1999), and market´s  pricing of discretionary accruals versus non - 
discretionary accruals (Subramanyam, 1996; Press et al., 1998). The focus of 
this paper is the performance of different accrual models in testing earnings 
management (hereafter EM). 
Shipper (1989) defines EM as a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intention of obtaining some private gain, as opposed 
to a neutral participation. Some restriction on manager discretion over 
accounting and other policies is expected, but some discretion will remain1. 
Shipper (1999) has since proposed a modification to the definition that 
identifies EM as “ implementation that impairs an element of decision 
usefulness or implementation that is inconsistent with the intent of the 
standards”.  
Another interesting definition of earnings management is provided by Healy et 
al. (1999). EM occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers2. 
Dechow et al. (2000) analyse different perceptions academics, practitioners and 
regulators have of EM.  
The problem researchers find when explaining accounting policy is that 
managers have an informational advantage over researchers as well as incentive 
to camouflage EM. Discretion exercised over accounting policy cannot be 
directly observed. Different accrual models, through the estimation of what is 
                                                          
1 Positive accounting theory provides an interesting framework where the existence of accounting discretion can 
be explained. Even though contracts that use accounting numbers to align managers and contracting parties´ 
interests would not be effective if managers had complete discretion over the reported accounting numbers,  
managers are likely to know best which accounting procedures are optimal from the point of view of all 
claimants, so some discretion will remain.   
2 The use of accounting judgement to make financial reports more informative does not fall within this definition.  
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called “non - discretionary, expected or normal accruals”3, provide earnings 
management investigation with a benchmark for the exercise of accounting 
discretion. So, the goal of these models is to separate total accruals into 
discretionary and non discretionary components.  
How well do “these models” work? This is a question that has been addressed 
in several studies. In a market- based evaluation context, Guay et al (1996) 
present evidence consistent with “considerable imprecision and / or 
misspecification “ in existing actual models. New models or modification of 
existing ones are often introduced by the improvements they make at generating 
type I errors and type II errors4. The specification of the test statistic is 
evaluated by examining the frequency with which they generate type I errors in 
a randomly selected sample of firm years. The power of the test statistic is 
evaluated by examining the frequency with which they generate type II errors in 
a sample of firm years in which the researchers have artificially added a fixed 
and known amount of accruals to each firm - year5.  
The general finding of this evaluation is that the power of tests is low for EM of 
economically plausible magnitudes and that the models produce reasonably well 
specified tests for a random sample of event-years. When models are applied to 
test firm years experiencing extreme financial performance, the models  lead to 
misspecified tests ( Dechow et al., 1995)6. This misspecification arises because 
the magnitude of normal accruals is correlated with past and current 
performance. This dependence occurs because firm performance conditional on 
past performance does not follow a random walk and because both operating 
accruals and operating cash flows are strongly mean reverting (Kothari, 2000). 
In testing the power of various models, Kang (1999) points out that even though 
simulation results are informative, there is no guarantee that accrual behaviour 
of simulated data is reflective of real EM. Dechow et al. (1995) and Kang 
(1999) evaluate the relative performance of different models in detecting EM on 
a sample of firms for which they have strong prior beliefs that earnings have 
been managed. These samples consists of firms that have been targeted by the 
                                                          
3 Due to the fact that the accrual models are really expectations models, Healy  (1996) proposed a renaming of 
some terms: “unexpected accruals” for “discretionary accruals” and  “unexpected earnings ” for “discretionary  
earnings“. 
4 Dechow et al. (1995) and Kang  et al. (1995) evaluate time - series models , and Jeter et al.  (1999) and Peasnell 
et al. (2000) evaluate cross - sectional models.  
5 These simulations are similar to those performed by Brown and Warner (1985) in evaluating alternative models 
for detecting abnormal stock price performance.  
6In the same way, Jeter et al. (1999) find evidence that the cross - sectional Jones model is misspecified for firms 
whose cash flows deviate systematically from the industry median. However, extending the Jones Model to 
explicitly control for cash flow from operations Jeter et al. (1999) show that the cash flow model is well specified 
for all cash flow levels.  
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for allegedly overstating annual 
earnings and firms suspected of earnings management to avoid losses7. 
The objective of this study is to test whether different  cross sectional models 
detect earnings management in a sample of firms suspected of having managed 
earnings. This sample consists of firms that have received audit qualification for 
GAAP violation in Spain from 1991 to 1998. Our research is based on two 
assumptions. The first is that auditors have correctly identify firms that violate 
GAAP. And the second assumption is that these firms have first employed the 
maximum discretion allowed within GAAP before using other accounting 
procedures outside GAAP. 
The economic determinants and the governance structure are key factors for 
explaining the different accounting policies followed by firms. We are not 
going to consider those factors that generate incentives and limitations to the 
exercise of accounting discretion. Although we think they are very important, 
the focus of this paper is limited to providing additional evidence on whether 
different accrual models detect EM when it does really exist. 
The average standardised prediction error is significantly positive for all models 
except for the margin  model, supporting the hypothesis that earnings have been 
managed upwards. Although these results could serve as evidence on the 
performance of alternative models measuring discretionary accruals in our 
Spanish context, we should take into consideration when interpreting these 
results that the prediction sample includes the more obvious and spectacular 
cases of earnings management.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The following section offers 
a conceptual revision of existing models for testing EM. Firm sample is 
described in section three. The results obtained are presented in section four and 
section five provides the conclusion of the paper. 
SECTION 2. ACCRUAL MODELS IN DETECTING EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
Researchers interested in testing whether firms use discretionary accruals 
(hereafter DA) to manage earnings must select a proxy for DA and they must 
isolate situations (the event) where the direction of EM can be predicted 
(McNichols et al., 1988). Although the ability of models to detect multi - period 
EM is still an open issue (Kang, 1999), it is important to consider that the use of 
accrual methology  for detecting event-specific EM is just a part of its 
applications. Accrual models have been used in tests of contracting and political 
                                                          
7 Burgstahler et al. (1997) find evidence of earnings management to avoid losses using a different methodology.  
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cost incentives to manipulate accounting numbers, in tests of the efficient 
contracting and opportunism hypothesis by correlating earnings with stock 
returns8 and, in tests of the joint hypothesis of market inefficiency and accrual 
manipulation with  capital market motivation9. 
In  the first part of this section we present discretionary accruals (hereafter DA) 
as a measure of the exercise of accounting discretion by managers in order to 
alter the reported earnings (section 2.1.). As not all accrual decisions represent 
cases of EM and as the discretionary exercise of accrual activity is not directly 
observable by the researcher,  they have to break down total accruals (hereafter 
TA) into discretionary and non- discretionary elements. The discretionary 
component is estimated by the difference between total accruals and the non - 
discretionary accruals estimation from an expectation model (hereafter NDA). 
This discretionary component will proxy for the real discretionary accruals 
(section 2.2.). In section 2.3. we analyse conceptual differences between time 
series and cross sectional models.  We will finish this section by summing up 
some statistical issues in regression analysis in order to better understand some 
problems on inferences concerning EM.    
2.1  Measures of earnings management 
Managers attempting to arrive at a desired level of earnings, motivated from 
event period or multiperiod incentives, can choose from a large set of 
manipulation methods. Some of them may involve real decisions (i.e., 
operating, financing and investment decisions) and some are pure accounting 
decisions (change in useful life of fixed assets, change in policy regarding 
capitalizing - expensing repairs, changes in depreciation method). In some 
cases, manipulation may be accomplished by a combination of a real decision 
and an accounting decision (Jiambalvo 1996). 
Once different ways used by managers for EM have been identified, the next 
step is to find a proxy for measuring the discretion exercised by them. An 
important issue is whether the discretion has been within GAAP or outside 
them. In terms of GAAP choices, the first proxy for the exercise of accounting 
policy discretion used in this research were accounting method choices or 
changes in accounting method choices. Zmijewski et al. (1981) adopted what 
they called “the income strategy approach” creating an EM weighted measure 
from different accounting methods, trying to control for the portfolio nature of 
income determination (Watts and Zimmerman,1990).  
                                                          
8 In these studies market efficiency is a maintained hypothesis. 
9 See Kothari (2000) for more details of these three streams of research where accrual models have been used.   
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The use of operating total accruals, rather than specific accounting methods to 
proxy for EM constitutes a great step forward in the EM literature. Healy (1985) 
broke down earnings into cash flow from operations and TA, paying special 
attention to the fact that accruals modify the timing of reported earnings, so that 
it enables the manager to transfer earnings between periods. This author 
suggests that it is more costly and more visible for managers to transfer earnings 
between periods by changing accounting procedures than by changing accruals. 
Moreover, managers appear to have greater flexibility to change accruals. 
Another important feature of this measure is that it aggregates into a single 
number the net effect of numerous recognition decisions, thereby takes into 
consideration the portfolio nature of income determination as Zmijewiski et al. 
(1981) hoped to do. However, accrual analysis constitutes a more 
comprehensive measure in the sense that this measure includes both the effect 
of accounting method choices and operating, financial and investment decisions 
insofar as they affect accruals.  
Manipulation outside of GAAP has been investigated in some studies. The 
samples used in these studies consisted of firms subject to accounting 
enforcement action by the SEC for alleged violation of GAAP (Dechow et al., 
1995, 1996;  Beneish, 1997), firms that corrected overstating earnings in 
previous financial statements (DeFond et al., 1991) or firms that disagreed with 
their auditors over the use of income increasing accounting choices (DeFond, 
1993).  
The sample used in this paper consists of firms that have received audit 
qualifications for GAAP violations. This sample is designed to provide 
additional insight into the detection of EM by different accrual models.  
Operating total accruals, defined as the difference between operating earnings 
and Cash Flow from operations, does not necessarily include EM outside 
GAAP. So, unless GAAP violations affect one of these components, TA will 
remain unaffected. Even if operating total accruals includes some accruals 
derived from GAAP violations, this is not the main focus of our investigation. 
An implicit assumption made in this study is that managers of firms which 
exercised accounting discretion outside GAAP, would have first used the 
maximum  discretion allowed within GAAP.  
Unexpected accruals, defined as the prediction error from different accrual 
models, will proxy for EM obtained through the discretionary application of 
accruals. These abnormal accruals are hypothesised to be positive if accrual 
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2.2. Accrual prediction models 
The proxy for discretionary accruals is obtained after subtracting non - 
discretionary accrual estimation from total accruals10. The parameters that shape 
the NDA model are estimated through an “estimation period” during which no 
systematic earnings management is predicted in time series accrual models, or 
through the use of “an estimation sample “ from the same industry  and year, 
providing a benchmark for the exercise of accounting discretion.  
The following models range from simple models in which DA are measured as 
TA, to more sophisticated models that attempt to control for economic 
circumstances, correlation structures of accruals and cash flows or statistical 
issues.  
2.2.1. The Healy Model 
Healy (1985) tests EM comparing mean TA across different firms samples. His 
partitioning variables divide the sample into different groups with earnings 
predicted to be managed upwards or downwards. Inferences in EM are made 
through pairwise comparisons of the mean TA. This approach is equivalent to 
treating the mean accruals of a sample as the estimation period and the other as 







NDA    =    estimated nondiscretionary accruals; 
TA      =     total accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 
t     =    1,2,… T is a year subscript for years included in the 
estimation period; and 
τ            =     a year subscript indicating a year in the event 
period. 
2.2.2. DeAngelo Model 
Last period total accruals is the measure of NDA in this model. In contrast to 
the following models, the Healy model and the DeAngelo use TA from the 
estimation period to proxy for NDA, without taking into account the response of 
normal accruals to changes in economic circumstances.  
                                                          
10 In order to make the nomenclature used in this paper simpler, we do not differentiate either discretionary 
accruals from discretionary accruals proxy, or non - discretionary accruals from non discretionary accruals 
estimation although it is important to know that researchers will never work with the real discretionary and non- 
discretionary accruals because they are not observable. 
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NDA τ = TA  τ -1 
This model assumes that the non discretionary component of accruals follows a 
random walk, which is inconsistent with the self reverting property of accruals.   
2.2.3. The Friedlan Model  
Since growth should affect certain aspects of a firm´s operations, including 
accruals, the random walk assumption underlying the DeAngelo model is not 
valid for growing firms. Friedlan (1994) introduces a modification to the 
DeAngelo model that attempts to control for the effect of growth on total 
accruals. This model assumes a constant proportionality between total accruals 
and sales in successsive periods. The non discretionary accruals for the Friedlan 
model are computed as: 
   NDAit = TAit-1 / Sit-1 
2.2.4. The Jones Model 
Jones (1991) determined NDA for each firm by regressing total accruals on the 
change in sales revenues (REV) during the period and the gross level of 
property, plant and equipment (GPPE)  using a time -  series of observations. 
These variables were included to control for changes in the firm´s economic 
circumstances, GPPE to control for the portion of TA related to non - 
discretionary depreciation expense, and REV to control  for the normal 
(unmanaged) level of current accruals. Sales revenues is an objective measure 
of the firm´s operation before manager´s manipulation, so that this variable will  
control for the economic environment of the firm11. 
NDA τ = α 1 (1/ A τ -1) + α 2 (∆REVτ )+ α 3 (GPPEτ ) 
where, 
∆REVτ  = revenues in year  τ  less revenues in year τ - 1 scaled 
by total assets at τ-1;  
GPPEτ = gross property plant and equipment in year τ scaled 
by total assets at τ-1; 
A τ -1 = total assets at τ-1; and 
α 1 , α 2 ,α 3 = firm-specific parameters. 
Estimates of the firm-specific parameters, α 1 , α 2 ,α 3, are 
generated using the following model in the estimation period: 
TA t = a 1 (1/ A t -1) + a 2 (∆REVt )+ a 3 (GPPEt ) + vt 
                                                          
11 Jones (1991) points out that this variable is not completely exogenous because revenues may be affected to 
some extent by managers´ attempt to  modify reported earnings.  
 
 
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO “NUEVAS TENDENCIAS EN DIRECCIÓN DE EMPRESAS” DT 09/01 
dtecadem@eco.uva.es    www2.eco.uva.es/ecadem 
8 
where, a 1 , a 2 , a 3   denote the OLS estimates of  α 1  ,α 2 , α 3  
and  TA  is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. 
The expected sign for the GPPE coefficient is negative because it is related to 
depreciation expense. However, the expected sign for the change in revenue 
coefficient in not obvious, since a given change in revenue can bring about 
income -  increasing changes in some working capital accounts but income 
decreasing in others.  
Another important assumption made in this model is that changes in current 
assets and current liabilities are both driven by changes in revenues. Current 
liabilities, such as payables, are more likely to be related to expenses than to 
revenues. The omission of this relevant variable produces a potential bias 
towards finding positive managed accruals in an economic upswing and 
conversely in an economic downswing (Kang, 1999). 
Systematic EM via the depreciation accruals is likely to have limited potential 
because the effect of changes in asset lives or in the depreciation method are 
required to be disclosed, so the associated earnings effects are comparatively 
sample to adjust ex – post. Because of this some authors have tested the Jones 
working capital model12.  
2.2.5. The Modified Jones Model 
Considering the possibility of EM contamination of revenues, the modified 
Jones model assumes that discretion over revenue is not exercised in the 
estimation period and that changes in credit sales in the event period result from 
EM. This model provides a more powerful means of isolating revenue - based 
manipulation than the Jones model (Beneish, 1998). But if no EM occurs in the 
event year, unmanaged accruals will be understated by α2∆REC, so managed 
accruals are overstated if  ∆ REC > 0.  
NDA τ = α 1 (1/ A τ -1) + α 2 (∆REVτ   - ∆RECτ )+ α 3 (GPPEτ ) 
where 
∆RECτ = net receivables in year τ   less net receivables in 
year τ - 1 scaled by total assets at τ - 1. 
2.2.6. The Industry Model 
The Industry model was used by Dechow et al. (1991). This model assumes that 
variation in the determinants of NDA are common throughout firms in the same 
                                                          
12 Janin (2000)  provides evidence of the importance of working capital accruals. Although depreciation and 
amortisation explain the greatest part of total accruals, working capital accruals among all the total accruals 
components, exhibit the greatest variability.   
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industry, without directly controlling for the determinants of NDA. In this 
model NDA for the event period will be estimated as follows: 
NDA τ = γ1 + γ2  median1   (TA  τ ), 
where,  
medianI   (TA  τ ) is the median value of total accruals scaled by 
lagged assets for all non-sample firms in the same 2-digit SIC 
code. 
2.2.7. The Kang and Shivaramakrishnan Model  
Kang and Shivaramakrishnan (1995) developed the following instrumental 
variable model: 
 [ACCBT/ AT-1] = Φ0 + Φ1[δ1REVT/ AT-1] + Φ2 [δ2EXPT/ AT-1] +   
Φ3[δ3GPPET/AT-1] 
where, 
δ1 = ARTT-1/ REVT-1 ,   δ2 = OCAL T-1/ EXPT-1  ,  
δ3 =DEP T-1/ GPPET-1 
ACCBT = accrual balance,  CAI, T  - CASH I, T  -  CL I, T  - DEPI, T 
AT = net total asset  
CA T = current assets 
CASH T = cash 
CL T = current liabilities excluding current portion of long term 
debt  
DEP T = depreciation and amortization 
ARTT = receivables  
OCAL T = all current asset less liabilities excluding accounting 
receivable, CAI, T  - ART I, T  -  CASH I, T  - CL I, T 
REVT = net sales revenues 
EXPT = all expenses other than depreciation expense 
GPPET =  gross property plant and equipment   
The three important features of this model are (Kang, 1999): 
- This model solves three important statistical problems that OLS estimation of 
Jones model has, simultaneity, errors in variables and omitted variables, by 
including expenses in the regression and using an instrumental variable 
approach. 
- The estimated managed accruals are calculated using the level, rather than the 
change of current assets and current liabilities. 
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- The parameters δ1, δ2, δ3 can be interpreted as turnover ratios which 
accommodate firm - specificity and compensate for the fact that the equation 
will be estimated from a pooled sample13. 
2.2.8. The Margin Model 
Like Jones - style procedures, Peasnell et al. (2000) model abnormal accruals on 
accounting as prediction errors from an OLS regression of accounting accruals 
on a vector of explanatory variables designed to capture “normal” accrual 
activity. Working capital  accruals is expressed as an explicit linear function of 
two drivers, sales and cash received from customers.  
WCAt = ω + γ1 REVt + γ2 CRt + et 
The parameter estimates of this model γ1 and γ2 have clear economic 
interpretations14: 
 γ1 reflects the average value of the sales margin and is predicted to be 
positive 
 γ2 reflects the average value of the cash margin and is predicted to be 
negative.  
2.2.9. The McCulloch Model 
The structure of this model is derived directly and explicitly from the structure 
of financial statements15. The most important feature of this model is its 
multiperiod approach. The effects of accrual  reversals  in future periods is an 
important issue to be taken into account when initiating discretionary accruals 
in the current period. Managers are thinking not only about the current period 
but also about future earnings.  The model is expressed as follows: 







θ NEWDA t-1 + NEWDA t 
where, 
AccRec = accounting receivables 
Revratio = (Revt-1accRect)/AccRect-1  
                                                          
13 Kang and Shivaramakrishan (1995) based their estimation on the longest available time - series of data. Kang 
(1999) based his estimation on a pooled cross - sectional firm´s data. Another difference is that the first work 
excludes tax related accruals whereas Kang (1999) includes tax related accruals. 
14 See Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) for the formal analysis of the model. As these authors indicate, the 
primary difference between the margin model and the Jones working capital model is that the margin model 
disaggregates the change in revenue term into two components at the parameter fitting stage, substituting cash 
receipts in the current period for revenues in the prior period. 
15 See McCulloch (1998) 
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θ NEWDA t-1 + NEWDAt 
CFOt= cash flow from operations 
The improvement of this model in accrual technology for investigating EM 
using DA can be seen through the incorporation of: 
 the reversal of discretionary accruals into the estimation procedure, paying 
more attention to the duration of the effect on EM and the time -series 
properties of accruals, 
 a contemporaneous negative correlation between DA and NDA, this 
correlation arises from the incentives that lead some managers to use DA to 
offset unfavourable NDA and from researcher measurement error, and 
 a relation between accruals and Cash Flow, this relation arises from the 
smoothing action of GAAP driving a negative relation between change in net 
cash flow and unmanaged accruals, and as a result of discretionary smoothing 
in which Cash flow will be negatively correlated with discretionary accruals.    
These innovations cannot be accommodated by the ordinary least squares 
approach to estimation because it requires the assumption that the regression 
(modelling NDA) and the residuals (proxing for DA) are uncorrelated. The 
author adopts a non linear instrumental design that allows the two components 
to be (negatively) correlated, and that allows the residual to follow the moving - 
average process. 
2.2.10. The CFO Model 
Shivakumar (1996) argues that a non - linear specification for cash flow from 
operation (hereafter CFO) is desirable since CFO may vary between firms in the 
estimation sample, due either to differences in the long - run level of return on 
assets or to matching and/or timing problems in CFO. This possibility has been 
implemented in the model allowing the slope coefficient on CFO to vary 
between firms as follows: 
NDAit = K0  + K1 ∆REVit / Ait-1 +  K2 GPPEit / Ait-1  + K3 d1it 
*CFOi / Ait-1  + κ4 d2it *CFOi / Ait-1 + Kκ5 d3it *CFOi / Ait-1  + Kκ6 
d4it *CFOit / Ait-1 + Kκ7 d5it *CFOit / Ait-1. 
where, 
CFO = cash from operations 
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This model has been tested by Jeter et al. (1999) using quarterly and annual 
data. An important feature of this model is that it is well specified for all cash 
flow levels.  
2.2.11. The accounting process model  
Dechow et al. (1995) and Guay et al. (1996) point out that the problems of the 
accrual models may derive from ignoring the time series properties and 
correlation structure of accruals and cash flows. The Cash flow model and the 
Mc Culloch Model we have just referred to, constitute the first attempts to 
incorporate cash flows to the modelling of non discretionary accruals.  
Garza- Gómez et al. (1999) introduce a discretionary accrual model based on 
the accounting process. “The Accounting Process Model” is designed to reflect 
the cross correlation between earnings, accruals and cash flows as well as their 
serial properties, which arise naturally from applying GAAP. This model is 
expressed as follows: 
NDA= φ0 (1/Ait-1) + φ1 (WKit-1 /Ait-2) +   φ2(LTAit-1 / Ait-2) +         φ3( 
CFOit/At-1) + φ4 (CFO it-1 / Ait-2)  
Where,  
WK = working capital accruals 
LTA= long term accruals 
CFO = cash flow from operations 
2.3. TIMES - SERIES AND CROSS SECTIONAL MODEL ESTIMATION 
The sample used for estimating expected accruals should be taken into account 
when interpreting parameter estimations.  The estimation samples used in time 
series models are past data of the same firms. During this estimation period no 
systematic earnings management are expected to occur. Past accrual activity of 
the firm is considered a benchmark to determine the DA for an event - specific 
study16. This approach suffers from a survivorship bias (ten observations at least 
are required to estimate time - series models). Moreover, this methology 
introduces a selection bias as firms with such a long time series are more likely 
to be large, mature firms with greater reputational capital to lose if EM is 
uncovered (Jeter et al. , 1999). Apart from survivorship, other important aspects 
of these approaches are: 
- Some structural economic changes may have occurred in such a long time. 
Although these models relax the assumption that NDA are constant over 
                                                          
16 Time - series models generate firm - specific parameter estimations. 
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time, they consider a stationary relation between NDA and its explanatory 
variables over time. 
- The self reverting property of accruals may introduce specification problems 
in the form of serially – correlated residuals.  
- The discretion available through this period is expected to have changed 
because of changes in accounting rules and changes in firms’ governing 
structures.  
Cross sectional models do not make any assumption regarding systematic 
earnings management for the estimation sample, but they implicitly assume that 
the model parameters are the same in all firms in an estimation sample (Jeter et 
al., 1999). The replacements of time – series models by their cross – sectional 
counterparts introduces new problems. “Abnormal accruals” estimated from the 
models should be interpreted as abnormal accruals relative to the industry 
benchmark. If EM is expected to occur in several firms in an industry due to 
specific situations, the cross - sectional approach will introduce a bias against 
finding evidence of EM. So, EM tests will reject the null hypothesis only when 
accrual activity is significantly different from that exercised by firms in the 
same industry. Moreover, cross  - sectional models are less likely to capture the 
effects of a) mean reversion in accruals, and b) dynamic accrual management 
strategies (Peasnell et al., 2000). Related to the number of firms in the sample, 
cross - sectional models have the potential to generate larger samples than time 
- series models.  
2.4. STATISTICAL  ISSUES 
The real discretionary component of TA is not possible to be observed by the 
researchers, so they are forced to estimate the discretionary element by 
imposing on TA an expectation model of the non - discretionary component. 
Another source of problems in  event - EM investigation is the omission of 
relevant variables for explaining DA and NDA( which induces measurement 
error in DA proxy).  
Tests of event - specific EM suffer from important statistical issues, which 
consequences Dechow et al. (1995) sum up in : 
 Incorrectly attributing EM to Part (dummy variable, 1 for the event year and 
zero otherwise) / unintentionally extracting EM caused by Part. This will 
occur when Part is correlated with the variables omitted explaining DA or the 
error in the researcher´s proxy for DA. 
 Low power test because of the exclusion of relevant (uncorrelated) variables. 
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Young (1999) has paid special attention to the problems arising from 
measurement error in DA proxy and the omission of relevant variables 
explaining DA. The source and magnitude of this measurement error depends 
on the effectiveness with which the expectation model of NDA controls for the 
factors that determine the non - discretionary component of TA. Results suggest 
that the five models he analyses induce systematic measurement error in DA as 
a function of operating cash flow  performance, sales growth and asset 
structure. Moreover, this author controls for relevant variables at explaining 
discretionary exercise of accrual activity, that is variables that control for 
differences in the propensity for earnings management, such as leverage, 
managerial equity ownership, size and income smoothing. The results obtained 
for some of these variables demonstrate the possibility for erroneous EM 
inferences when the DA proxy contains predictable measurement errors.  
Hansen (1999) has also examined measurement error in discretionary accrual 
models. He finds that structural changes are associated with the direction and 
magnitude of discretionary accrual estimates and that the measurement error 
associated with these structural changes is correlated with the level of earnings. 
Since the level of earnings is often used by researchers to partition EM 
incentives or is correlated with the partitioning variable, this bias in 
discretionary accrual models generated by structural changes could cause 
researchers to reach incorrect EM conclusions.  
Focusing on the non - discretionary accrual estimation by ordinary least 
squares, Kang (1999) identifies three statistical problems applying to the Jones 
model, simultaneity, errors in variables and omitted variables. Simultaneity 
arises because of failure to incorporate the identity constraint “accruals = 
earnings - cash flow from operations”. Errors in variables are due to the fact that 
regressors can be manipulated, and the omitted variable problem results when 
key determinants of unmanaged accruals are omitted. These problems will be 
solved by introducing expenses as a variable in the model and by applying an 
instrumental variable approach.  
3. SAMPLE 
The sample of firms used to evaluate the models consists of 27 firms listed on 
the Madrid Stock Exchange that have first received audit qualification for 
GAAP violation from 1991 to 1998. As results from these violations earnings 
have been overstated17. Financials are excluded from the sample because of 
fundamental differences in the nature of their accruals and cash flows that are 
not captured by expectation models of normal accrual activity. The main source 
of information has been the database “Auditoría de cuentas anuales” published 
                                                          
17 One firm of this sample has an audit qualification whose effect is an overstatement in equity.  
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by the “National Stock Market Commission” on a computer support, which 
includes the annual accounts and audit reports of most of the companies under 
the control of this commission. 
     TABLE 1 
Data available has severely limited empirical testing of accrual models. A time 
series approach cannot be applied since consistent definitions of earnings, 
accruals and cash flows would restrict portfolio estimation to the years after 
199018. 
The cross sectional approach we adopt requires a sufficient number of 
observations in the industry -  year portfolio, so all firms with fewer than six 
were excluded. Only firms with unqualified opinions from auditors are included 
in the sample estimation. As this sample remains very small ( mean 12 and 
median 10) , we tried to solve this problem by including all  industry portfolio 
from the same year 19 and  introducing a set of industry dummy variables.   The 
final sample comprises 241 firm year observations spanning  7 industry groups. 
The mean (median) number of firms in the year portfolio was  26 (27). Annual 
sample sizes are in table 1. Finally, we have estimated NDA from a pooled 
sample, considering an industry  - year set of dummy variables and an industry 
set of dummy  variables.  
Data available has restricted the models that can be tested in this study to the 
Jones model, The modified Jones model, The Jones working capital model, The 
modified Jones working capital model and the margin model. The information 
needed to compute TA definition and its explanatory variables is obtained from 
firms’ annual reports.  
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Consistent with previous studies of EM, TA is computed as: 
TA t = (∆ Current Asset - ∆ Cash )- (∆ Current Liabilities - ∆ Short -  term debt) 
- Depreciation and amortization expense 
WAt = (∆ Current Asset - ∆ Cash )- (∆ Current Liabilities - ∆ Short -  term debt) 
Contingency estimates are taken into account in the computation of TA through 
the variable Dep. Tax related accruals are not included in this definition, except 
                                                          
18 Apellániz et al. (1995) find that the change in Spanish accounting regulation, the 1990 general accounting plan, 
reduced management´s opportunities to manipulate earnings.   
19 Only industry portfolios where there is a firm with GAAP audit qualification have been considered in the 
estimation sample.  
 
 
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO “NUEVAS TENDENCIAS EN DIRECCIÓN DE EMPRESAS” DT 09/01 
dtecadem@eco.uva.es    www2.eco.uva.es/ecadem 
16 
from tax contingencies. Another important feature of this measure is that it does 
not include accruals from extraordinary items. 
Ordinary least squares is used to obtain the coefficient estimates for different 
models. Prediction errors represent the level of discretionary or abnormal 
accruals.  
Ujp = TAjp / Ai p-1 - NDA 
Significance tests are computed using standardised prediction errors which are 
computed as: 
Vjp = ujp / s (ejt ), 
where  
s (ejt) is the standard deviation of the error term from the cross sectional model 
estimated for firm j. 
Parametric significance tests of the standardised prediction errors are computed 
as  
Zvp = ∑  Vjp / [∑ (Tj - k)/ (Tj – ( k + 2))]1/2 
Where,  
Tj  is the number of firms in the estimation sample 
 K is the model degree of freedom 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the parameter estimates and the test 
statistic generated (except for the independent term) for the Jones model, the 
Jones working capital model and the margin model20.  
    TABLE 2 
The GPPE coefficient presents the expected sign in seven out of eight years in 
the Jones model. The two coefficients in the margin model also present the 
expected sign but they cannot reflect the sales margin or the cash margin 
because they are too high in most of the years.  The two variables of this model, 
revenues and cash received, are highly correlated21.  
                                                          
20 The estimation results for the modified Jones model are the same that estimation results for the Jones model. 
As Beneish (1998)  points out ∆REVt - ∆RECt can be rewritten as (CRt - REVt-1) where CRt equals Cash 
Received in period t and re – specification of the modified Jones model in this way highlights the absence of any 
strong economic intuition for the purposed adjustment in the estimation sample. 
21 We cannot pay too much attention to the coefficient estimates in 1997 since the estimation sample consists 
only of 7 firms. The Z statistics remain similar without including the firm that has received GAAP audit 
qualification in 1997.  
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When referring to the pooled sample, all coefficient estimates present the 
expected sign and are significant at one percent in the margin model. The GPPE 
coefficient is also significant at one percent in the Jones model and the revenue 
coefficient is significant at five percent in the Jones working capital model. 
However, revenue variable is not significant in the Jones model22.  
As we can see in table 3, the Z statistic is positive and statistically significant at 
conventional levels for  all models but for the margin model, so we can reject 
the null hypothesis that the average standardized prediction error is less or equal 
to zero. The results obtained from the modified Jones model and the modified 
Jones working capital model are very similar to the Jones model and the Jones 
working capital model, respectively23.  
    TABLE 3 
Although the results obtained could serve as evidence on the performance of 
alternative models measuring discretionary accruals in our Spanish context, we 
should be cautious when interpreting them because the prediction sample 
includes the more obvious and spectacular cases of earnings management and 
also because of the small number of firms available for  the models estimations.  
As contingency estimates may be subject to important manager´ judgement and  
although they are part of long term accruals they are related to current variables, 
we have also estimated  the working capital accrual models considering them. 
However, the results are not different from these shown in this paper24.  
Accounting literature has shown us that existing accrual models are not useful 
for firms experiencing extreme financial performance. The accrual models 
tested by Dechow et al. (1995) reject the null hypothesis of no earnings 
management at rates exceeding specified test levels when applied to samples of 
firms with extreme financial performance. High rejection rates arise because 
firm – years with low (high) earnings also tend to have low (high) total accruals 
and accruals models attribute part of the lower (higher) accrual to negative 
(positive) discretionary accruals. On the other hand, low (high) cash flow from 
operation samples have high (low) total accruals resulting in an over – rejection 
( under – rejection) of the null hypothesis that earnings management is less or 
equal to zero (more or equal to zero). The results of the investigation carried out 
by Peasnell et al. (2000) indicate that the margin model generates relatively 
                                                          
22 The results remain similar when considering an industry set of dummy variables instead of an industry - year of 
dummy variables for the pooled sample. Data are available upon request to the authors.  
23 That is, the modified Jones model and the modified Jones working capital model do not outperform the Jones 
model and the Jones working capital model. Although the revenue coefficient estimated in these models is 
positive, these results are due to the fact that the change in receivables is not very important and sometimes the 
level of receivables is even less than the year before. 
24 Data are available upon request to the authors. 
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better specified estimates when cash flow performance is extreme than the 
Jones working capital model and the Modified Jones working capital model. 
These findings are of particular interest for tests of EM in response to a 
stimulus. If the stimulus selected by the researcher is correlated with firm 
performance, false causal determinants of EM may be attributed to the stimulus.  
Since the results of this paper could be driven by a potential extreme 
performance sample bias, we have analysed whether our sample belongs to the 
highest earnings decile or to the lower cash flow decile. Although only one firm 
belongs to the highest earnings decile, nine firms could be classified in the 
lowest cash flow decile, suggesting that our results could be due to the problem 
of the over – rejection of the null hypothesis that EM is less or equal to zero as 
has been pointed in Dechow et al. (1995).  
Some researchers worried about the limited usefulness of  accrual models for 
firm with extreme performance, have developed a model that provides a means 
of assessing the likelihood of opportunistic reporting among firms with large 
discretionary accruals. This is the case of Beneish (1997)25. This model adds to 
the modified Jones model two variables, lagged total accruals and a measure of 
past price performance, improving the specification of this model. 
Despite these models having a general application, with the exception of firms 
experiencing extreme financial performance, it is important to jointly consider 
the situation  and form in which earnings management is expected to occur and 
the models of non discretionary accruals. This implies taking into account the 
different models´ ability to detect specific forms of earnings management26 and 
some particularities of a country’s accounting  regulations.  The findings in 
Peasnell et al. (2000) suggest that the Jones working capital model and the 
modified Jones working capital model are substantially more powerful at 
detecting subtle revenue and bad debt manipulations. However, the margin 
model outperforms the Jones working capital model and the modified Jones 
working capital model. So, these authors suggest that the use of several models 
in combination may improve the detection of accrual management, the specific 
form of which is impredictable.  
Young (1999) evaluates discretionary accruals estimated by different models 
using a method that controls for potential variation in the propensity for EM 
activity. If firms in the industry present a high propensity to manage earnings, 
the benchmark provided by cross sectional models may also be too high, so that 
it will be difficult to detect earnings management. 
                                                          
25 This author proposes the use of this model where extreme financial performance is likely, such as security 
offerings and financial distress.  
26 McNichols et al. (1988) model the provision for bad debts in the absence of EM  and use the expected 
provision for that model to test EM. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Several cross sectional models (the Jones model, the modified Jones model, the 
Jones working model, the modified Jones working capital model and the margin 
model) have been examined in a Spanish context. The sample of firms 
suspected of having managed earnings consists of firms that have received 
GAAP audit qualifications, so these firms represent the most obvious and 
spectacular cases of earnings management. We select this sample in order to test 
the ability of different accrual models to detect EM when it does really exist in a 
Spanish context. The abnormal accruals detected are significantly positive for 
all models except for the margin model. Potential extreme financial 
performance bias can not be ruled out as an explanation for these results. An 
important limitation of this paper is the estimation  and the prediction sample 
size, so these results should be interpreted cautiously. 
By adding evidence on the usefulness of different accrual models as a tool to 
detect EM, the results of this paper contribute to the EM literature in two ways. 
First, we provide additional evidence on whether different accrual models detect 
EM  by using a sample of firms suspected of having managed earnings instead 
of a sample where a fixed and known amount of accruals have been added to 
each firm. Second, this paper provides additional evidence on the use of accrual 
models in a different accounting regime, such are the Spanish accounting 
regulation, characterised by a high degree of conservatism introduced by the 
principle of prudence.  
Future investigation into earnings management must seek to improve accrual 
models technology to detect earnings management. Young (1999) has identified 
the source of systematic measurement error but it remains to be seen how to 
control for them in new models.  
An issue of a great importance to be considered in EM investigation is the 
relation between the context in which EM is hypothesized and the NDA model. 
This context includes special GAAP features in countries too. Models have 
different ability to detect specific forms of EM activity so this ability and the 
specific form of EM one expects to find, should be taken into account when 
choosing among different models. Since the discretionary accrual model 
provides us with a benchmark for the determination of the exercise of 
discretionary accruals activity, the propensity and restriction for EM  of sample 
estimation firms is specially relevant in cross sectional models. 
Another important issue is that TA definition does not include extraordinary 
items. The accounting discretion exercised through these items may be 
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considered in this kind of investigation as complementary means of EM 
(McCulloch, 1998).  
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TABLE 1: Distribution of sample estimation firms by industry group 
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 Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares estimates for accrual models ( annual 
sample estimation and pooled sample estimation) 
The Jones model TA= α1 + α2 ∆ REV + α3 GPPE+ e 
The Jones working capital model: WCA = α1 + α2 ∆ REV+ e 
The Peasnell Pope and Young model: WCA = ω + γ1REV + γ2 CR + e 
 
Jones adj R2 α2 tα2 α3 tα3 
1991          0.17 0.06 0.80 -0.09 -3.08 
1992          0.48 0.18 1.86 -0.12 -2.83 
1993          0.49 0.30 4.69 -0.04 -1.33 
1994          -0.09 0.03 0.30 -0.01  -0.17 
1995          0.26 -0.07 -0.41 -0.18 -3.30 
1996          0.29 0.08 0.93 -0.02 -0.70 
1997          -0.16 -0.26 -0.57  0.45  0.82 
1998          0.01 0.03 0.50 -0.03 -0.96 
 
Jones WK Adj. R2 α2 tα2 
1991            0.34 0.22 4.13 
1992            0.25 0.23 2.17 
1993            0.49 0.30 4.97 
1994            -0.01 0.15 1.25 
1995            0.04 -0.04 -0.41 
1996            0.21 -0.14 -1.43 
1997            -0.09 -0.31 -0.71 
1998            -0.03 0.05 0.81 
 
Margin M.   Adj. R2 γ1 tγ1 γ2 tγ2 
1991            0.54 0.68 6.96 -0.68 -6.93 
1992            0.68 0.89 5.97 --0.89 -5.89 
1993            0.73 0.94 8.26 -0.94 -8.08 
1994            0.10 0.33 1.76 -0.31 -1.62 
1995            0.57 0.95 5.77 -0.96 -5.82 
1996            0.84 0.92 12.72 -0.92 -12.80 
1997            0.20 0.95 1.88 -1.18 -1.85 
1998            0.76 0.96 9.17 -0.97 -9.44 
 
Pooled sample estimation     
 Adj. R2 α2 / γ1 tα2 / tγ1 α3/ γ2 tα3/ tγ2 
      
Jones             0.14 0.01 0.27 -0.05 -3.36 
Jones WK      0.07 0.07 2.04   
Margin model        0.56 0.91 16.42 -0.91 -16.41 
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TABLE 3: Z – statistic for 27 GAAP audit qualification firms 
 






Jones model 2.4729* 1.9845** 
Modified Jones model  2.4564* 1.9666** 
Jones Working Capital model 2.5198* 2.0988** 
Modified Jones Working Capital 
model 
1.8129** 1.9942** 
Margin Model -0.8207 -0.7124 
* Statistically significant at the 0.01 level ( one - tailed) 
** Statistically significant at the 0.05  level (one – tailed) 
